The Sky Has Eyes: Why the Ukraine War Demands a Rewrite of Western Air Doctrine

Written by [ Colonel (ret) Bernie Derbach, KR Droneworks ]

The air campaign in Ukraine has not followed the script written in Western military academies. For decades, Canada, the US, and NATO have operated under the assumption of Air Superiority—the idea that we would own the skies, suppress enemy defenses, and rain fire with impunity. The war in Ukraine has shattered that assumption.

Instead of Top Gun-style dogfights or uncontested bombing runs, we are witnessing a brutal stalemate of Mutual Air Denial, where cheap, expendable drones have democratized air power and rendered the battlefield transparent.

This is a wake-up call. The current air warfare doctrines of the West are facing an existential crisis. Here is my detailed analysis of why we must rewrite the rulebook, and where the future of drone warfare fits in.

1. The Death of "Air Superiority" as a Default

Western military doctrine is built on the foundation that "Air Superiority is Job #1." We assume our expensive, high-tech fighter jets (like the F-35) will quickly destroy enemy air defenses.

The Ukraine Reality:

Russia, despite a massive numerical advantage in aircraft, failed to secure the skies. Why? Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). Both sides possess dense networks of Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), from long-range S-400s to handheld Stingers.

• The Lesson: It is exponentially cheaper and easier to deny airspace than to control it.

• Doctrinal Shift Needed: We must prepare to fight without air cover. The era of "safe skies" for ground troops is over. Doctrine must shift from Air Supremacy to Air Denial—focusing on survival in contested airspace rather than assuming we can clear it.

2. The "Transparent Battlefield"

One of the most jarring lessons for Western observers is that stealth is dead—not just for jets, but for ground troops.

The Ukraine Reality:

In Ukraine, if you move, you are seen. If you are seen, you are hit. The saturation of cheap surveillance drones means there is no "fog of war" in the traditional sense. The enemy is always watching.

• NATO Challenge: Current reconnaissance doctrine relies on "stand-off" distance and concealment. These concepts are obsolete when a $500 drone can hover silently over a tree line.

• The Shift: Doctrine must be re-written to assume constant observation. Camouflage is no longer just visual; it must be thermal and electronic.

3. The Glass Cannon: Can Drones Defeat the F-35?

As we look to the future, the question arises: Can cheap drones really threaten 5th-generation marvels like the F-35 or the upcoming 6th-generation F-47?

The answer is yes—but not in a dogfight. It is about economics and attrition.

The "Economic Kill"

The greatest threat a drone swarm poses to an F-35 isn't shooting it down; it's forcing it to shoot. An F-35 carries a limited internal payload. If a swarm of 20 cheap decoys approaches, the pilot faces a dilemma:

• Fire: You destroy a $50k drone with a $1M missile, reveal your position, and return to base empty. Mission failed.

• Don't Fire: The drones get close enough to track your heat signature or jam your communications.

Base Denial: The Achilles Heel

Advanced fighters are "runway queens." They require pristine, long concrete strips. You don't need to fight the F-35 in the air; you launch a swarm of 100 Shahed-style drones at its airbase. Even if air defense shoots down 95%, the 5 that get through damage the runway. The billion-dollar jet is now grounded by a lawnmower engine with wings.

4. A Strategic Pivot for Canada and NATO

Canada stands at a dangerous crossroads. Our defense policy has traditionally been "buy what the Americans buy, but fewer." This strategy is failing because the cost of entry for "peer" warfare is skyrocketing, while the cost of disruption (drones) is plummeting.

For NORAD: The Arctic Gap

• The Old Threat: Soviet Bombers coming over the pole.

• The New Threat: Cruise missiles and long-range stealth drones that hug the ice, invisible to traditional radar.

• The Pivot: Canada should rely less on scrambling jets from Cold Lake and more on High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) drones. We need a fleet of continuous-surveillance drones (like the MQ-9B SkyGuardian) that stay in the Arctic sky for 30+ hours. We need "eyes" more than we need "shooters."

For NATO: From "Heavy Metal" to "Smart Niche"

• The Problem: Canada cannot field enough tanks or jets to make a decisive difference in a massive European ground war.

• The Pivot: Canada should specialize in Counter-UAS (C-UAS). Instead of sending a half-strength tank squadron, Canada could provide NATO with specialized "Drone Defense Battalions"—units equipped with electronic jammers and laser weapons to protect Allied HQs.

5. The Economics of Interception: Why We Are Losing

The current model of air defense is financially unsustainable. We are shooting down cheap drones with expensive missiles. This is a path to bankruptcy, not victory.

The table below illustrates the stark economic disparity between the attacker's cost and the defender's cost using current technology versus emerging solutions.

The "Cost-Per-Kill" Reality Check

System Type	Example Weapon	Approx. Cost Per Shot (USD)	Target (e.g., Shahed Drone)	Economic Outcome
Traditional High-End	Patriot Missile (PAC-2/3)	$2 - $4 Million	~$20,000	Catastrophic Loss (Defender spends 100x target value)
Mid-Tier Missile	NASAMS / AMRAAM	$1.2 Million	~$20,000	Heavy Loss (Sustainable only for high-value targets)
Man-Portable (MANPADS)	Stinger Missile	$480,000	~$20,000	Significant Loss (Inventory depletion is the bigger risk)
Gun Systems	Gephard / 35mm Flak	$2,000 - $4,000	~$20,000	Win (Effective, but range is limited)
Directed Energy (Laser)	DragonFire / Iron Beam	$13	~$20,000	Decisive Win (Cost is electricity; "Infinite magazine")
High-Power Microwave	Epirus Leonidas	<$10	~$20,000	Total Dominance (Can fry entire swarms instantly)

Analysis:

• The "Missile Trap": Relying on Patriots or AMRAAMs to stop swarms is a losing strategy. An adversary can simply bankrupt us by launching cheap decoys until our magazines are empty.

• The Laser Promise: Technologies like the UK's DragonFire or Israel's Iron Beam change the math entirely. At $13 a shot, the defender finally has the economic advantage.

• Canada's Opportunity: Canada should invest heavily in the bottom two rows (Lasers/Microwaves). We have the tech sector to build these, and they are the only viable defense against the swarms of tomorrow.

Conclusion: The Return of Mass

The war in Ukraine has proven that mass has a quality all its own. The West's obsession with quality—having the best, most expensive tech—is a liability in a war of attrition.

We are moving toward Tactical Network-Centric Warfare. Future air warfare will not be pilot-vs-pilot; it will be algorithm-vs-algorithm. If we continue to prepare for the "clean," high-tech wars of our imagination, we will lose the messy, gritty, drone-saturated wars of reality.

We must stop buying platforms based on how they perform at airshows, and start buying them based on how they survive a swarm.